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CONTRACTS: PARTY HELD LIABLE IN
QUASI-CONTRACT FOR THE VALUE OF
SERVICES RENDERED RATHER THAN
BENEFIT RECEIVED
In Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Authority the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the measure of recovery in an action
based on a contract implied in law2 was the fair market value of the
services rendered and not the value of the benefit that the TVA
received. Having entered into an oral agreement to microfilm certain
technical journals through an agent of the TVA who had no
authority to make such an agreement and acted in violation of the
TVA competitive bidding statute,3 Campbell delivered the microfilm
to the TVA and destroyed the original journals. Another agent who
accepted delivery was not authorized to do so, and it was not until
two months later that the TVA learned of the film's presence in its
library and returned it to Campbell. During the intervening period
only three of 336 film cartridges were used by the public. Campbell
refused to accept the return of the film and filed a complaint in the
United States District Court against the TVA alleging breach of
contract.' The TVA's motion for summary judgment was granted,
and Campbell then amended his complaint to state an action based
upon a contract implied in law.5 The case was tried on this theory,
and the jury granted recovery in the amount of the contract price,
1. 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1969), reh. en banc denied per curiam, 421 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1970).
2. The court uses the terms "quantum meruit" and "contract implied in law" as
equivalents. See 421 F.2d at 294. However, because of the confusion surrounding quantum
meruit, see notes 14-25 infra and accompanying text, that term will be avoided in this article
whenever possible.
3. 421 F.2d at 294, 16U.S.C. § 83 lh(b) (1964) provides:
All purchases and contracts for supplies or services. . . made by the Corporation, shall
be made after advertising, in such manner and at such times sufficiently in advance of
opening bids, as the Board shall determine to be adequate to insure notice and
opportunity for competition. ...
The section then provides for certain exceptions which do not apply in this case.
4. 421 F.2d at 294.
5. Id.
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after finding that sum to be fair market value of the services
rendered.' On appeal the TVA contended that the district court
committed error in instructing the jury to determine the amount of
recovery by "the fair market value of the microfilm . . . .", The
Court of Appeals affirmed over a lengthy dissent which contended
that the TVA was not liable, or if it were liable, the measure of
recovery should be limited to the value of the benefit the TVA
received.8
A careful examination of not only the distinction between
contracts implied in law, otherwise known as quasi-contracts, and
contracts implied in fact but also a discussion of the correct use of
the term "quantum meruit" is necessary for a proper understanding
of the issues presented by the majority and dissenting opinions.'
Technically, an implied in law contract does not involve a
contractual obligation because it is not based upon any agreement
of the parties in either the objective or subjective sense.'0 An implied
in fact contract, however, does involve an agreement in the objectNe
sense. As a Pennsylvania court has explained:
A quasi contract arises when the law implies a duty upon a person not
because of any express or implied promise on his part to perform it, but even
in spite of any intention he might have to the contrary. . . . [A] contract
implied in fact . . . is an actual contract . . . which arises where the parties
agree upon the obligation to be incurred, but their intention . . . is inferred
from their acts in the light of the surrounding circumstances."
The practical significance of this distinction between implied in law,
or quasi-contracts, and implied in fact contracts is the measure of
recovery under each. The amount of recovery on a contract implied
in law is limited to the value of the defendant's unjust enrichment,
there being no express or implied promise for the court to enforce.'2
On the other hand, in an implied in fact contract action there is an
6. Id. at 295.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 296. For the dissent of Judge Rives, see id. at 298-307.
9. See Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YAL.E L.. 533, 550-52 (1912), for the
distinction not only between contracts implied in law and contracts implied in fact but also
between contracts implied in law and torts.
10. See F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CoNTRAcTs § 4, at 6 (1913); Corbin, supra
note 9, at 551-52.
11. Cameron v. Enyon, 332 Pa. 529, 532, 3 A.2d 423, 424 (1939). See Ames, The History
ofAssumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 63 (1888).
12. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 10, § 4; Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and
MutualAssent, 33 HARV. L. REV. 376, 376-77 (1920).
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implied promise to pay the plaintiff the fair market value for the
services he provides, and this promise is enforced by granting
recovery equal to such fair market value. 13 The importance of the
distinction between a contract implied in law and one implied in fact
is apparent when the value of the services rendered is not equal to
the value of the benefit received. Unfortunately, this distinction is
often lost in the confusion which surrounds the use of the term
"quantum meruit." Blackstone, writing at a time when implied in
fact and implied in law contracts were referred to together as implied
contracts,'14 stated that if he employed a servant and failed to "make
him amends," the law would give the servant a remedy in assumpsit
on quantum meruit for the fair market value of his services. 15 Today,
Blackstone's example would be that of a contract implied in fact, 6
and quantum meruit recovery would seem to be limited to such
cases. At common law, however, since the action of assumpsit would
be sustained "if the plaintiff proved an express promise, or a
promise inferred from acts other than verbal expression, or . . .any
quasi-contractual obligation that the court was willing to
recognize,' '1 7 the courts often failed to distinguish the basis upon
which recovery was granted, and any action asking for recovery for
work done was designated quantum meruit.5 The shortcomings of
such a broad use of quantum meruit became important as the courts
began to distinguish between contracts implied in law and those
implied in fact. 9 Some courts limited quantum meruit actions to
those based on a contract implied in fact and allowed quantum
meruit recovery in the amount of the fair market value of the
services rendered, 0 while other courts allowed quantum meruit
actions based on contracts implied in law and recovery in the
13. See 5 X. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992, at 6 (1951) [hereinafter cited as CoRBIN]; F.
WOODWARD, supra note 10, § 4; Corbin, supra note 9, at 550.
14. For a discussion of the mutual assent theory of contracts which requires a meeting of
the minds for the formation of a contract see 3 W. PAGE, CONTRACTS § 1497, at 2560 (1920).
See generally I S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3, at 3 (1926).
15. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 161 (1966 reprint).
16. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305. See generally id. § 2-204.
17. 1 CORBIN § 20, at 42 (1950). For a general discussion of the confusion surrounding
assumpsit and the distinction between implied in law and implied in fact contracts see 3 W.
PAGE, supra note 14, § 1495; F. WOODWARD, supra note 10, § 4.
18. See I CORBIN § 20, at 43.
19. The case of Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.R 1760) marks the emergence
of the separate contract implied in law action. F. WOODWARD, supra note 10, § 2, at 2.
20. See, e.g., Colyer v. Lahontan Mines Co., 54 Nev. 358, 360-61, 20 P.2d 654, 655 (1933).
See also Moncrief v. Hall, 63 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 1953).
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amount of the benefit received.2 1 The danger in such a diverse use
of the term "quantum meruit" became obvious whenever courts,
after labelling an action "quantum meruit," failed to determine
whether the underlying action was one based on a contract implied
in fact or one implied in law and applied the wrong measure of
recovery.2 Although such a misapplication of the remedy may not
always alter the outcome of a case,2 3 it does lead to
misunderstanding as to what the proper measure of recovery is in
an action based upon a contract implied in law. Further confusion
is caused by a court's failing to state when it is applying an
exception to the general rule of recovery in implied in law contract
actions. For example, in cases where the contract is unenforceable
because of the statute of frauds, and courts do not limit recovery to
the value of the benefit received, statements have been made which
indicate that the measure of recovery in an action based upon a
contract implied in law is the fair market value of the servicesprovided.u
21. See, e.g., Ylijarvi v. Brockphaler, 213 Minn. 385, 393-94, 7 N.W.2d 314, 319 (1942)
(the court limited quantum meruit actions to those based on a contract implied in fact and
found on the facts of the case that there was no such contract). See also Carpenter v. Josey
Oil Co., 26 F.2d 442, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1928); Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Colbert, 127
S.W.2d 1004, 1007-08 (rex. Ct. Civ. App. 1939), revd on other grounds, 136 Tex. 268, 150
S.W.2d 771 (1941). For courts allowing recovery in quantum merult upon both a contract
implied in law and one implied, in fact see Duncin v. Backman, 3 La. App. 421, 423 (1926);
State v. Haley, 94 N.H. 69, 72, 46 A.2d 533, 535 (1946).
22. See Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539, 542 (1877); Williams v. United States, 127
F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955). For a discussion illustrating the
difficulties a court may encounter in determining if a contract is implied in law see Martin v.
Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127, 130-31 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946).
23. The outcome of the case will not be changed by the misapplication of remedy where
the fair niarkt value of the services rendered equals the value of the benefit received. For an
example of the confusion that a court may cause see Costigan, supra note 12, at 387-88 n. 19,
where the author criticizes courts for indicating that they are utilizing a ')rule of thumb" test
and allowing quasi-contractual recovery in an amount equal to the fair market value of the
services rendered, when they are in reality enforcing something akin to an implied in fact
contract.
24. E.g., Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 308 P.2d 245 (1957); see RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 347 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 62, at 243 (1937). Courts
allowing recovery when a contract is unenforceable because of the statute of frauds point to
the intent of the parties to make a contract and, because they cannot enforce the contract,
grant recovery on an implied in law contract in the amount of the fair market value of the
services rendered. 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 536 (rev. ed. 1948). For claims that
granting recovery in the amount of the fair market value of the services rendered is
enforcement of the contract in violation of the statute of frauds see Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky.
233, 239, 154 S.W. 900, 903 (1913); S. WILLISTON, supra note 14, § 536; Costigan, supra
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Once the distinction between a contract implied in law and one
implied in fact and the reasons for the confusion surrounding the
term "quantum meruit" are understood, an analysis of the TVA's
legal status and partial immunity is helpful in determining the
liability of the TVA upon a contract implied in law. The TVA
appears to enjoy a varying status depending upon the particular
function under examination, even though the enabling legislation
provides that the organization "[m]ay sue and be sued in its
corporate name."' ' Notwithstanding the Tucker Act's prohibition of
actions implied in law against the United States,26 this clause has
been given a broad interpretation, reflecting both the disfavor of
sovereign immunity generally and judicial decisions concerning other
analogous governmental corporations. 27 This interpretation has
resulted in the TVA being generally treated as a non-governmental
corporation when exercising its corporate power and, hence, subject
to an action based upon a contract implied in law.2s Despite this
broad interpretation of the "sue and be sued" clause, the TVA is
still considered an instrumentality of the United States and enjoys
the same immunities as the federal government when it is subject to
state regulations or when it is acting in a traditional governmental
note 12, at 392-93. &u see 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 536 (rev. ed. 1948). For examples
of other "exceptions" to the general rule of recovery in implied in law contract actions see
W. PAGE, supra note 12, §§ 1549, 1551. For a commentator who would extend the
"exceptions" to the limitations on implied in law contract recovery see I C. ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPALCORP. LAW § 10.08, at 700 (1968).
25. 16U.S.C. § 831c(b)(1964).
26. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964) provides: 'The Court of Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States. . . founded upon
any express or implied contract with the United States .... This Act is interpreted as not
granting the Court of Claims (or under other relevant sections, the district courts) jurisdiction
in cases where, if the transaction were between private parties, an action based upon a contract
implied in law would lie. See Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925); Tatem Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 386 F.2d 898 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Here, as in other areas, the courts have used
the term "quantum meruit" indiscriminately and have said that the Tucker Act prohibits
actions in quantum meruit against the United States when, in fact, an implied in law contract
is involved.
27. See generally RFC v. J.Q Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941); FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S.
242 (1940); Woodbury v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 924 (D. Ore. 1961); Darlington Inc. v.
FHA, 142 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
28. See Posey v. TVA, 93 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1937); United States v. Pressnell, 219 F. Supp.
727 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); United States v. General Electric Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (N.D. Ala.
1962); City of Tullahoma v. Coffee County, 204 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 328
F.2d 683 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
29. See TVA v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944); TVA v. Local 110, Sheet Metal
Workers, 233 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Littleton v. Vitro Corp., 130 F. Supp. 774 (N.D.
Ala. 1955); Grant v. TVA, 49 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1942).
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area, such as navigation control? Because the TVA is neither a
purely business nor a purely governmental entity, questions arise as
to its liability for the unauthorized acts of its agents and for
contracts which are awarded in violation of bidding requirements.
By analogy to other governmental corporations, it would seem that
the TVA, like the United States government, should not be liable in
an implied in law contract action for the unauthorized acts of its
agents. 3 1 This nonliability for the contracts or acceptances of
unauthorized agents arises because one dealing with a governmental
corporation is charged with notice of its agent's scope of authority."
Yet, the corporation may be liable on a contract implied in law for
the unjust enrichment it receives.3 3  However, because an
unauthorized acceptance is the equivalent of no acceptance, the
governmental corporation, having received no benefit, cannot be held
liable even on a contract implied in law for an unauthorized
acceptance unless it later impliedly or expressly ratifies that
acceptance. 4 By analogy to other governmental corporations and
municipal corporations, a policy question is raised whether the TVA
should ever be held liable upon a contract implied in law when a
bidding statute has been violated by an agent's unauthorized act.
The old rule was that no recovery would be allowed if the bidding
statute was not followed because to allow such recovery would defeat
the purpos6s of the bidding statute.35 The trend is away from this
30. See Lynn v. United States, 110 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1940); Atchley v. TVA, 69 F. Supp.
952 (N.D. Ala. 1947); Grant v. TVA, 49 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1942); cf. Adams v. TVA,
254 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
31. For examples of the breadth of the application of the non-liability rule see Federal Crop
Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70 (1940)
(Farm Labor Board); de Bilbao-Bastida v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 409 F.2d
820, 822 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 802 (1969); Farmers Elevator Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Jewett, 394 F.2d 896, 899 (10th Cir. 1968) (United States Warehouseman);
Mahoney v. Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp., 393 F.2d 156, 162 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 837 (1968); ANA Small Business Inv. Co. v. Small Business Admin., 391 F.2d 739,
743 (9th Cir. 1968); Arthur Venner Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 748, 750 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(Army Corps of Engineers).
32. The reason why one dealing with a public corporation is on notice of the scope of the
agent's authority is said to be the protection of the public treasury. See Federal Crop Ins.
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
33. See generally United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566
n.22 (1961); Bake Construction Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
C. ANTEEAU, supra note 24, § 10.02, at 686.
34. Cf. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566 n.22 (1961);
Trinity Hosp. Ass'n v. City of Minot, 76 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1956).
35. See Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210Cal. 348, 291 P. 839 (1930);
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view, and many courts now look to see if the bidding statute is
directory or mandatory.36 It has been suggested that this mandatory-
directory distinction is an unconscious balancing of the social
utilities involved.3 7 On one side is the desire to prevent unjust
enrichment while on the other side is the desire to prevent collusion
and fraud and to promote economy. One resolution of this weighing
has been to grant recovery based on a contract implied in law in an
amount equal to the value of the benefit received unless fraud or
collusion was shown, in which case no recovery is allowed.3 In short,
the TVA has been regarded as a governmental-corporate hybrid
which is not bound by the unauthorized acts of its agents and which,
by one resolution of the policy issues involved, could be held liable
for the benefit it receives pursuant to a contract which has been
made in violation of proper bidding procedures.
In Campbell v. TVA 3 the Fifth Circuit proceeded from the
premise of the TVA's liability and, without discussing the nature of
quantum meruit, held that the measure of recovery was the value of
the services rendered." Considering the measure of recovery as the
only principal issue to be decided, the majority examined the dicta41
and holdings 2 of several cases and concluded that there was a
conflict between the courts as to the proper measure of recovery in
an action based upon quantum meruit or a contract implied in law. 3
The majority discussed neither the possibility of extending the statute
of frauds exception to the rule of recovery in an implied in law
contract action" nor the cases limiting recovery to unjust enrichment
when a bidding statute has been violated. Rather, the court
Fluet v. Eberhardt, 294 Mass. 408, 2 N.E.2d 463 (1936); Bremerton Municipal League v.
Bremer, 15 Wash. 2d 231, 130 P.2d 367 (1942).
36. See Lykes v. City of Texarkana, 223 Ark. 287, 265 S.W.2d 539 (1954); O'Neill v. City
of S. Omaha, 102 Neb. 836, 170 N.W. 174 (1918); Home Owners Constr. Co. v. Borough of
Glen Park, 34 N.J. 305, 169 A.2d 129 (1961); Edwards v. City of Renton, 67 Wash. 2d 598,
409 P.2d 153 (1965).
37. See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 24, § 10.27, at 755-57; Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability
of Municipal Corporations, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1171 (1934). See also C. ANTIEAU, supra
note 24, § 10.24.
38. See Wakley v. County of St. Louis, 184 Minn. 613, 240 N.W. 103 (1931).
39. 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1969).
40. Id. at 296.
41. Id. at 295-96.
42. Id. at 296.
43. Id. The court treats "quantum meruit" as a synonym of "contract implied in law."
Id.
44. See note 24 supra.
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concluded that the real benefit that the TVA received was having the
film available for use in its library, that the benefit could not be
measured in terms of dollars, that the film had value only to the
TVA, and that therefore the "rule of thumb test" allowing recovery
in an amount equal to the value of the services rendered would be
applied.45 The dissent rejected the majority's basic premise that the
TVA was liable, implicitly assuming that the TVA's liability on the
unauthorized contracts of its agents was the same as the United
States government's liability on that type of contract, and concluded
that the TVA was not liableA' The dissent recognized that recovery
on a contract implied in law was allowable against the United States
in certain circumstances and attempted to define these circumstances
by distinguishing between a contract implied in law upon which,
because of the dissent's interpretation of the Tucker Act, no recovery
can be allowed and an implied in fact contract upon which recovery
can be allowed.47 Having rejected the contract implied in law action,
the dissent also found that the TVA could not be held liable on a
contract implied in fact because acceptance of the film was
unauthorized. 8 As an alternative position, the dissent argued that
even if the TVA were liable, its liability would be limited to the
"'minuscule" benefit it received from the public's use of the film."
To hold that the benefit was having the film available for use, the
dissent contended, would ignore the fact that previous to Campbell's
destruction of the original journals the same reference sources were
available for use.0
Although the decision that the measure of recovery against a
governmental corporation on a contract implied in law is the fair
market value of the services provided appears to be unique, the
major significance of Campbell v. TVA5 is the resolution of several
policy issues. The court answered affirmatively sub silentio the
following three considerations: (1) whether one dealing with a
governmental corporation should be held to know the scope of
authority of the corporation's agent; (2) whether a remedy based
upon a contract implied in law should be available when a bidding
45. 421 F.2d at 296.
46. Id. at 298-307.
47. Id. at 299-305.
48. Id. at 302.
49. Id. at 306.
50. Id. at 305-07.
51. Id. at 293.
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contract procedure has not been followed; and (3) if recovery upon
a contract implied in law is allowed, whether the statute of frauds
exception to the general rule of recovery in implied in law contract
actions should be extended to the bidding situations. As evidenced
by the lack of discussion on any of the issues, however, it is doubtful
that the court was even aware of these considerations. Resolution of
the policy issues raised by Campbell cannot be found unless a court
considers not only the status of the TVA but also the nature of a
contract implied in law and the appropriate recovery where a bidding
statute is involved. The dual nature of the TVA as a governmental-
corporate hybrid 2 raises many questions, and a court should neither,
as the dissent did, automatically assume that the TVA is the
equivalent of the United States government nor ignore the TVA's
status as a governmental corporation, as the majority appeared to
do. Rather, a court should determine if the TVA requires any or
some of the benefits of its governmental status when it is operating
in a private business capacity. The earlier suggestion that the TVA
be subject to suit in an implied in law contract action but not be
liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents is suggested as a
possible resolution of this dilemma.5 By disallowing recovery where
there is fraud or collusion, the purposes of preventing the same
would not be compromised. Once this inquiry is concluded, a court
should consider the essence of a contract implied in law for the
purpose of determining the appropriate recovery. The court must not
be misled by the term "quantum meruit," the danger of which is
apparent in Campbell where the majority treated an action in
quantum meruit and an action based on a contract implied in law
as synonymous54 and then mistakenly cited to the term "quantum
meruit" in cases where it was not used synonymously with contract
implied in law.- Had the Campbell court made such an inquiry, the
conflict found by the majority in the case authority as to the
measure of recovery in an action based upon a contract implied in
law would have been found to be illusory since one case involved an
implied in fact contract," one an implied in law contract,5 7 and the
52. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 38supra and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 296.
55. Id. at 295-96. The cases cited in which quantum meruit was not the equivalent of a
contract implied in law included Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916) (quantum
valebant) and Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
56. In re Moyer, 190 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Va. 1960).
57. Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1956).
Vol. 1970:573]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
third the previously discussed statute of frauds exception to the usual
benefit received recovery awarded under an implied in law contract.5
The court's application of the "rule of thumb," which allows
recovery in an amount equal to the fair market value of the services
where the value of the benefit received cannot be ascertained,"9
further indicates the danger of not analyzing the term "quantum
meruit," for courts apparently limit the application of this rule to
statute of frauds cases! ° To apply the rule, when a contract is im-
plied in law, as the court in Campbell did, would draw the jury away
from the real issue of unjust enrichment and more towards the
judicial enforcement of an otherwise unenforceable contract. To
avoid being misled by the term "quantum meruit," a court must
determine if it is dealing with an implied in fact or an implied in
law contract. Having failed to distinguish these types of contracts,
the court failed to reach the further issue of whether the reasoning
which led to the statute of frauds exception should be extended to
the bidding contract. It is suggested that any such extension would
detract from the effectiveness of the bidding procedures by always
assuring plaintiffs a return equal to the value of their services."
58. Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 308 P.2d 245 (1957); see note 24 supra.
59. The court cites Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 HARv, L.
Rev. 376, 387 (1920), as authority for the use of the "rule of thumb" measure of damages
in an implied in law contract action. 421 F.2d at 296. Costigan indicates, however, that the
"rule of thumb" should not be used in implied in law contract cases and that when courts
do use the "rule of thumb" they are enforcing something akin to an implied in fact contract.
The cases he cites, Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 125 P. 860 (1912) and
Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky. 611, 85 S.W. 209 (1905), which apply the rule are statute of frauds
cases. Thus, it would seem that the court's own source limits the applicability of the "rule of
thumb" to statute of frauds cases. As earlier discussed, courts have generally granted recovery
in an amount equal to the fair market value of the services rendered in statute of frauds cases
without the help of the rule. See note 24 supra. For arguments against extending the statute
of frauds exception and the "rule of thumb" see note 61 infra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 23 and 59 supra.
61. This is the view of the majority of the courts. See C. ANTiEAu, supra note 24, § 10.08,
at 700. Antieau, however, takes the minority view on reasoning analogous to that in the statute
of frauds cases. See note 24 supra. This or any suggested extension of the "rule of thumb"
measure of recovery seems questionable since it could lead to the subversion of both the statute
of frauds when the contract is oral as in Campbell, and the bidding statute. See notes 37-38
supra and accompanying text.
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